There is a growing interest in secession, or what some refer to as a national divorce, between Red and Blue America. Georgia Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene has called for it on multiple occasions, there is a developing literature on the topic, and, according to one Axios poll, 20% of Americans support a national divorce.
In my new book, The Disunited States, I contribute to this discussion by taking seriously what a project of American secession would like look. Based on my research of secessionist dynamics globally and historically, I contend that America is ill-suited for a peaceful national divorce. In fact, American secession would almost certainly cascade into violent conflict. I conclude that while America’s current polarization is a serious problem that needs to be addressed, secession is not the solution some might think or wish it to be.
This is a public-facing, non-partisan book. It is meant to be accessible and free of academic jargon. It includes several dystopian vignettes of what the future might look like if secession were attempted. The book was not written for so-called red America or blue America, but for all Americans.
The book outlines three common arguments that secessionists make. The first and most important argument is about irreconcilable differences. This is the argument that red and blue Americans no longer see eye to eye on a range of issues including immigration, gay rights reproductive rights, and climate policy, among others. Given that the result is extreme polarization and political deadlock, the smart thing to do is separate – not unlike estranged spouses – so that the two sides can go on to live productive lives.
The second argument is that Americans have a legal right to secede. In some cases, secessionists challenge the United States Supreme Court case Texas v White (1869), which ruled that unilateral secession was unconstitutional. The secessionist rebuttal takes several forms, but the common theme is that the case was wrongly decided. These arguments typically refer to more general philosophical arguments, variously referred to as Choice Theory or Primary Rights Theory, that minority nations have a right to secede via a democratic process.
The third argument is that smaller political units are better because they are more homogenous, all else equal, and can design policies that are closer to the preferences of the average voter. These arguments draw on work in political economy about the optimal size of states. The upshot is that America is too big and diverse. Smaller units would be better.
These are the core arguments for American secession. However, the first one regarding irreconcilable differences is the master argument. It is the polarization-fueled catalyst driving the current secessionist sentiment. The other arguments regarding a right to secede or that small states are better are more theoretical in nature. They are mostly ignored when society is functioning well but can be picked up when times are bad and secessionists are casting around for arguments to make.
The book develops these three arguments in detail. To conduct the research, I interviewed secessionist leaders of CalExit, the Red-State Secessionists, the Texas Nationalists, and secessionists in New Hampshire. Note that secessionism in America can be roughly divided into two categories: (1) The Red/Blue ideological form, and (2) The regional form focused on specific federal states like Texas. Although the book is primary aimed at the ideological form, I do discuss the limits of the regional form and further contend that both forms would be active if America disintegrated into a secessionist conflict.
Overall, I contend that these arguments are unconvincing. The problem with the first argument regarding irreconcilable differences is that it champions the wrong solution to a real problem. There is no doubt that polarization in America is a problem that needs to be addressed, and I sympathize with the frustrated parties who turn to secession. But most secessionists in America (and globally) have a limited understanding of how secession works. This is understandable given that secession is an unusual process, not governed by domestic law, that few people have direct experience with. For example, the great importance of international recognition, the United Nations application process, and the deference given to already recognized national governments typically comes as a surprise to secessionists.
Seceding and becoming a recognized sovereign state is a difficult process. The American Civil War was an attempt at secession, just as the American Revolution was a successful case of secession. There are roughly 70 active secessionist movements in the world, and the last state to be born via secession was South Sudan in 2011. Most secessionist efforts fail, and roughly half of them become violent. When they do secede peacefully, it is when specific conditions hold. There is a distinct and regionally concentrated nation, with clear internal borders, and a special administrative status that justifies why that nation can secede when others cannot. The Czechoslovak Velvet Divorce was an example. But these conditions do not hold in America.
The attempt to divide America into two or more countries would almost certainly produce great violence. The so-called red and blue populations are intermixed, and many Americans hold moderate positions. Trying to unmix that population and disassemble the country would create a cascade of hyper-polarization and ideological conflict.
In chapter 5, I attempt to map out different ways that America could be divided between a so-called Redland and Blueland. I discuss three blueprints based on: (1) a division by red and blue states; (2) a division by red and blue congressional districts; (3) a division by red and blue counties. The blueprints illustrate the fundamental problem of trying to divide a population of 340 million Americans who are quite intermixed geographically and ideologically. Most of America is purple and political divisions run through neighborhoods and households.
The three blueprints demonstrate what I call the “scale problem.” That is, there is no way to draw new borders that properly sorts everyone and creates a rational map. The scale at which you draw the map comes with tradeoffs. If Redland and Blueland are divided by states, then the map is somewhat coherent, but millions of Americans will find themselves in the wrong country. If the map is divided by the 5,000 or so counties, then more Americans will be properly sorted into the country they want, but the resulting map will be a hopeless jigsaw of intermixed islands of red and blue.
Although the core of the book is focused on explaining why secession will not work in America, I do discuss the arguments for a legal right to secede and that smaller units are better. I contend that while these debates are fascinating, they are ultimately unconvincing. The balance of contemporary American constitutional law is against unilateral secession, and the notion that a collection of smaller American units will do better only works if they remain highly integrated, an unlikely outcome given the violence that would certainly attend American secession.
The book concludes with a plea for staying together. Although America has its problems, they are better worked out through frank dialog than a violent divorce.