British elections deepen British-Irish political entanglements
By Paul Gillespie
Political events and processes are increasingly entangled across Britain and Ireland, reflecting historical and contemporary interdependencies and the common impact of European and international change. The May 7 devolved elections in Scotland and Wales, together with English local elections, and the recent Makerfield and Scottish by-elections illustrate these realities. They were closely followed in Ireland North and South for signs of political change and stability in British politics and the future of the UK’s political union. How will the dominance of three nationalist parties in Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish politics affect all this and will they cooperate on constitutional change? What does Reform’s emergence as the main party in England mean for the general election due by 2029; how sustainable is that trend and if Nigel Farage then became prime minister could the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement survive? How will a Labour government with Andy Burnham as prime minister differ in policy and performance from Keir Starmer’s and would he conduct British-Irish relations differently?
Brexit dramatised the British-Irish relationship, setting the scene for such current political entanglement. The United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union posed the question of whether the border between them would be at the Irish border or in the Irish Sea. Ireland’s intense diplomacy within the EU helped ensure it was the latter, as confirmed in the 2023 Windsor Framework agreement. Research shows that outcome remains acceptable to a majority of voters in Northern Ireland, though support has been declining and is now at its lowest levels; but voters are divided by religious affiliation and constitutional preference. Across the divides their trust in politics in decreasing, including in the British government’s capacity and willingness to look after Northern Ireland’s interests. Religious and constitutional polarisation sees increasing proportions of DUP and TUV voters supporting Reform, Brexit and looser ties to the EU. On the overall effects of Brexit, 66% of voters in Northern Ireland agree it has made the break-up of the UK more likely; only 19% disagree. Leave voters are evenly split on the question; 86% of Remain voters agree that Brexit has made the break-up of the UK more likely; only 3% disagree.
Such stark findings underline the salience of these British political questions for Northern Ireland. Their salience in the Republic arises from that potential instability in the neighbouring island’s political system and the consequences of any UK breakup for Ireland North and South. Scenarios of deep reform to bed the devolution settlements down, potential breakup of the Union if that is not done or prolonged impasse which would postpone but not resolve the issue have been suggested by members of this Across Britain and Ireland blog group.
From an Irish perspective that helps clarify the issues at stake through this period of uncertainty. A united Ireland is not at all a priority everyday issue for voters in the Republic; they are preoccupied with cost of living, housing and other infrastructure shortages and gaps exposed by a strong economy in which over a fifth of the labour force are born elsewhere. Despite Sinn Féin’s strong commitment to a united Ireland its position as the largest party has much more to do with these issues than their position on the national question. The coalition Government’s policy has been for a Shared Island based on a strategy of reconciliation between the different religious, cultural and political traditions and identities North and South before constitutional change is contemplated; but coalition partner Fine Gael recently announced plans for a party commission on what a Unified Ireland would look like. That differentiates it from its coalition partner Fianna Fáil, which has traditionally favoured a united Ireland policy. The Fine Gael initiative has stimulated more public discussion of unity.
Substantial funding of two billion euro is pledged over the next decade to achieve a Shared Ireland through investments and projects. However the perspective of gradual and mutually beneficial change on which the policy is predicated is rudely interrupted by the prospect of more sudden structural shifts in the British political order thrown up by these elections and the underlying trends they express.
This contrast between desired and potential futures has stimulated critical commentary from former Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar about the need to plan for instability and sudden constitutional upheaval in the UK, in which he joins similar criticism from academic researchers. Responding adequately to that possibility, they say, involves political responsibility, prudential foresight and active engagement – statesmanship in short. Other research shows everyday citizens are interested in exploring the positive potential of a new decentred Ireland. Unity would bring a new state into the European Union, could harness prosperity and dynamism from the Republic’s economy and yet allow different political identities to flourish mutually. These questions are more open and exploratory than before, which is why the performance of the UK’s political and economic systems are now greater factors in discussions about Irish constitutional futures.
Sinn Féin, the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru expressed more willingness to communicate about working in common after the elections. For Sinn Féin to take the emergence of a UK-wide factor of instability seriously is new, as is the SNP’s willingness to deal politically with them. It will be interesting to see whether they cooperate on constitutional matters, notably on whether and how referendums on secession could be called, ahead of the Northern Ireland Assembly elections next year. A comparison between the three parties’ attitudes to England as a successor state of the UK shows they each have considered that but not in any real detail. On Scottish independence that decision is reserved to Westminster politically and legally. In Northern Ireland the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement says it is for the Secretary of State to make an order for a poll, and secondly that he shall exercise the power if it appears likely there is a Northern Ireland majority in favour of a united Ireland.
The growing fragmentation of the UK’s party politics could give nationalists greater leverage in forming future coalition governments. That possibility could arise in any cross-party bargaining to avoid a Reform government led by Nigel Farage in 2029 or before it. The prospect of Farage in power with or without the Conservatives puts UK constitutional instability more on the political agenda in Ireland North and South, as in Scotland and Wales. Reform and the Conservatives are both pledged to take the UK out of the European Convention on Human Rights, mainly because it constrains their plans on immigration. But the convention is a cornerstone of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement with the Irish government, so that raises a question mark over whether it could survive. Alongside such legal uncertainties there is the wider question of English nationalism as a driving force and whether it expresses reduced willingness to support Northern Ireland’s position in the UK and the fiscal transfers involved. Similar uncertainties exist in Scotland and Wales about a resurgence of muscular unionism based on absolute Westminster sovereignty.
Labour’s failure to deliver reforms and better living standards under Keir Starmer’s leadership is a major reason for the party’s collapse in popularity. Starmer has had a strong commitment to improve British-Irish relations after the Conservatives, arising from his knowledge of Northern Ireland and interest in the island as a whole. That has shown up in the excellent rapport he reached with Micheál Martin and the Fianna Fáil-Fine Gael coalition, with annual summit meetings, closer defence and security cooperation and mutual interests in greater UK convergence with the EU among the highlights. The coincidence of Starmer’s leadership crisis with the nationalist resurgence reinforces the impression of drift and potential tipping points in British politics with consequences for Ireland. Starmer’s presumed successor Andy Burnham has most knowledge of and sympathy for better relations with Dublin. His role as Mayor of Manchester and advocacy of greater regional equality within England sharpen his interest in stronger devolution settlements and more consistent efforts to preserve the UK union.
As these changes play out in coming months and years we can expect Irish voters, political leaders and researchers to pay more attention to British political events and processes. It is partly a matter of scale in which the smaller entity knows more about the larger one than vice versa - and it is smart to do so. Imperial and post-imperial power add to the mix in the Irish-British relationships. We need more sophisticated concepts and analytical tools to understand terms like nation, sovereignty and political unions if we are to appreciate what is driving them as they unravel and reconfigure in a wider European and global setting.
Dr Paul Gillespie directed the 'Constitutional Futures after Brexit' project in the School of Politics and International Relations in University College Dublin, 2020-25, where he is a senior research fellow. He is a columnist and former foreign policy editor of The Irish Times.