Irish ruling parties compete and converge on unification plans
By Paul Gillespie,
The dynamics of coalition inter-party politics in the Republic have produced a significant new public discussion on the possibility of Irish unification and how the Irish state should prepare were it to happen. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, the two major centre-right coalition parties, have separately made commitments to prepare plans and options for constitutional futures, including scenarios for a unitary, devolved or federal united Ireland. Importantly too, they both see the need to plan for a continuation of the status quo with reformed rules on power-sharing in Northern Ireland and deeper relations between North and South and between Ireland and Britain. They believe this open-ended approach can encourage more unionist participation in the conversation.
At its annual conference in Cork on November 7 the Fine Gael party published A Blueprint for a Unified Ireland, including calls for a minister for North-South relations, a planning unit in the Taoiseach’s office, an independent cross-party consultative forum and a range of potential costs €3bn (£2.5bn) to €25bn (£20.8) to the Irish exchequer, depending on what Irish unity looks like, what is agreed with the UK and how much it costs to bring Northern Ireland pay and welfare to the same levels as that in the Republic of Ireland. It is the most considered political document of its kind to have been issued by the party in recent years. Based on independent reports from two academics who survey the now substantial body of research in this area the document maps the many areas requiring more investigation for informed political choice about how a unified Ireland might look. The party is now committed to restructure the state’s approach to that question and can do this while it remains in government for the next three years.
Micheál Martin, current Taoiseach of the coalition and leader of Fianna Fáil, said in an interview nine days before the Fine Gael conference that he is setting up a unit in his office to study, evaluate and add to the existing research on a potential united Ireland. It would be based on three scenarios – a unitary state, a devolved one and a continuation of the constitutional status quo. It will conduct research on legal/constitutional issues, public services like health and education, the costs of unification, security and defence, flags, symbols and other relevant issues. He is impatient with those who advocate near-term referendums on a united Ireland assuming it is inevitable, before reconciliation between Irish nationalist and British unionist identities. That sentiment lies behind the Shared Island Initiative he has supported since 2020. It supplements structures established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in the North-South Ministerial Council with a substantial programme of infrastructure investment, public dialogue and engagement programmes.
Martin targets Sinn Féin especially because he believes its call for referendums on unity are ill-thought out and premature compared to the poor state of reconciliation and weakness of power-sharing in Northern Ireland. Calls for unity in this setting will only antagonise unionists. That explains his reluctance to consider preparations for a potential unity process – despite the widespread conviction in Irish politics and public opinion that Brexit was a disaster precisely because British politicians failed to anticipate what could result from it happening. His important shift towards more focussed planning for potential constitutional change is partly a response to internal pressure on his leadership from more nationalist Fianna Fáil members and partly due to Fine Gael’s initiative. However both party shifts are explained, they put the unity question on a new plane of serious public discussion and decision in Ireland South and North.
Leo Varadkar, former leader of Fine Gael and Taoiseach 2017-2020 and 2022-2024, helped stimulate change in his party’s position after he left office. He has said repeatedly it is advisable to prepare for possible unity referendums because of the volatility in British politics, which could see a sudden opportunist decision on a unity poll by a potential Farage or Conservative government. That East-West dimension is not prominent in Fine Gael’s plans, but is taken into account as a factor of instability and uncertainty in UK politics which challenge assumptions about its future.
The party commissioned Deirdre Heenan, professor of social policy in Ulster University and a longtime research and public activist on Northern Ireland affairs, to produce an independent report which could form the basis of its proposed blueprint. Stephen Kinsella, professor of economics in Limerick University was asked to examine existing research on the economics of unity in a parallel report. Alongside that the party reconvened its Northern Ireland consultative group, chaired by Emer Currie TD, which organised four forums of Fine Gael members over the summer months. Their report to the party conference takes account of all this activity and incorporates much of the two consultants’ reports.
Heenan’s 118 page paper is based on an overview of recent research on Irish unity, extracting key themes, and then on 75 interviews with academic researchers, officials, party leaders and activists, media and community figures, from which she also reports on major themes raised. Her personal policy recommendations and political principles draw on these. It is an impressive piece of work which reflects her own views and experience. Themes from the literature cover the momentum now behind unity discussions, including from Brexit and the rise of English nationalism; the emerging demographic Catholic plurality and the cross-community generational divide in attitudes towards unity. These recur in her interviews. But they deal with a much wider set of issues: the rise of ‘others’ disclaiming unionist or nationalist identities; the possibility of loyalist violence; reforms in Stormont’s working arrangements; the need to protect minority identities; defence and security; cross-border collaborations; and a sympathetic but realistic attitudes towards the use of citizens’ assembles.
She deals strongly with health, one of her specialities, and makes the case for an all-Ireland free access system as a logical path beyond the existing two sub-optimal ones in any unification process. She finds there is overwhelming support for more planning and preparation for whatever constitutional futures emerge, to take a more proactive charge of Irish policy. Her emphasis is on unity as a process, not a one-off event – a recurrent theme, which she applies imaginatively to the question of reconciliation. She describes this is a nebulous concept used to stall discussion of unity in “a unionist veto dressed up as conflict resolution”. It can provide a perverse incentive for loyalist violence. She flips the question, saying reconciliation is not an end state. Planning and preparation are better conceived as part of any reconciliation process, since they provide space for deliberation and clarity on genuinely contested areas which cannot be agreed on easily or at all but need mutual trust to navigate. This is a real advance on previous discussion of the concept.
Heenan makes eight recommendations to Fine Gael. A standing cross-party constitutional forum on Irish unity is needed to inform the process. A ministry for unity should be created in the Irish government, open to the best and brightest civil servants. A dedicated sovereign wealth fund should be created. North-South collaboration should be deepened and accelerated. Irish citizens in Northern Ireland should be allowed to vote in Irish presidential elections. Northerners should become standard appointees by the Taoiseach to the Seanad. A publicly available repository of research on Irish unity issues should be created in this ministry. And an investigation is required into how local government in both parts of the island can be enhanced and reformed in any new Ireland, She concludes with a set of normative principles that should guide these discussions. They draw on John Hume’s ideas and echo Fine Gael’s expressed values on consent and non-violence, just as her recommendations draw on academic writers such as Brendan O’Leary..
Heenan notes how political scientists and economists have come to very different conclusions on the potential costs of unity – and says this needs further work. She explicitly references the influential view by economists John FitGerald and Edgar Morganroth: “the idea that the UK would continue to pay pensions while a united Ireland collected the annual insurance contributions seems most improbable”. Kinsella’s 45 page paper, The Economics of Reunification, clearly identifies pensions, debt interest charges and the potential growth rate of a united Ireland as the key variables at play in the several scenarios he surveys from the extant research literature on the costs on unity. He applies an economic modelling calculator to the higher cost one argued by these two economists and to a much lower cost one proposed by the political scientist John Doyle in research papers and a new book on preparing for Irish unity. Doyle assumes the UK side would agree to take on the cost of pensions and debt in negotiations, whereas FitzGerald and Morgenroth’s reject that. According to Kinsella: “The results depend heavily on the harmonisation cost of bringing Northern Ireland pay and welfare to Republic levels, and the published estimates of that cost differ widely.” To assess potential cost he uses four models of a possible negotiated outcome: unitary from day one; federal (devolved); managed integration (phasing over 20 years); and higher cost from day one,. He explains: “The four designs differ in how fast pay and welfare rise, how much extra is spent in the first ten years and how much duplicate administration is kept. The deal with the UK is set separately, so any design can be run on either deal.” This too is an impressive document, analysis not advocacy, and it will become a definite reference point in this debate.
Fine Gael’s published 34 page blueprint document, endorsed by Simon Harris, will be further discussed and developed by its parliamentary party. The blueprint wants to build understanding, strengthen relationships and prepare for the future, he says, with evidence, independent research and dialogue with other parties. Support for Irish unity, which is a founding value of Fine Gael, also carries “a responsibility to prepare for it”. It would double spending on the Reconciliation Fund, particularly on youth and education, strengthen British-Irish cooperation, and the North-South Ministerial Council. Its proposals echo closely those formulated by Deirdre Heenan. Thus it supports a standing constitutional forum to operate over five years with an option on two more to promote deliberation; it wants to see a minister of state appointed on Northern Ireland in the Taoiseach’s office, and responsibility for Northern Ireland to be transferred there from the Department of Foreign Affairs; detailed research on unity would be funded from there across government departments; presidential voting and Seanad nominations from Northern Ireland are favoured. The focus on stronger local government in a unified Ireland is also supported.
Micheál Martin and Simon Harris are to discuss these proposals in coming weeks and it makes much sense to find a common approach. The Fine Gael positions are more developed and advanced that Fianna Fáil’s. Now they have both been publicised we can expect a more dynamic public discussion. Their shifts have been welcomed by Sinn Féin and other nationalists in Northern Ireland. Their enthusiasm has been boosted by the latest LucidTalk poll. It narrows the gap between those not wanting and wanting a border poll to 46% to 42%, compared to 10 points the last time the poll questions were asked in 2024. Caveats apply as the poll is a panel of actual voters, and therefore does not represent the non-voters who would turn out in a referendum. The poll comes at a times of real crisis in unionist identity and cohesion, following divisions over the Garvaghy road Orange march, a complete impasse on budget negotiations with London and disagreements on whether to continue power-sharing. This is all ahead of the Stormont elections on May 6 next year.
That these political developments draw so substantially on recent academic research about constitutional futures is a tribute to those who have done the work from these political leaders. The commitments to continue and deepen it with state resources and to fund further independent research should encourage practitioners in this field. The implications for politics across Ireland and Britain are plain to see, as academic and political judgments are made about the likely negotiating positions of British and Irish governments, what parties might be in power to make them, and on the instability and uncertainty of the UK union’s own constitutional future and what shapes that might take.
Such factors drove the meeting of Sinn Féin, Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru leaders in Cardiff on September 14 at which in a memorandum of understanding they affirmed their respective rights to sovereign independence from the UK and pledged to cooperate on achieving that goal, while affirming their distinct interests and national positions in doing so. Andy Burnham’s comments that Irish unity is off the table and similar remarks about Scotland underline the political connectivities involved. For example the SNP will pay particular attention to research on London’s attitudes to Northern Irish pension and debt obligations. Likewise the Welsh government’s decision announced on November 10 to launch a new advisory commission on constitutional futures was enthusiastically noticed by nationalists in Belfast. Such events expose the limitation of an excessively internalist or island of Ireland frame of analysis which underestimates the role of the British state and wider EU and international forces bearing on Irish unification issues. We can expect to see a lot more transversal politics between Britain and Ireland in coming years.
Dr Paul Gillespie directed the 'Constitutional Futures after Brexit' project in the School of Politics and International Relations in University College Dublin, 2020-25, where he is a senior research fellow. He is a columnist and former foreign policy editor of The Irish Times.