Irish Unity: Why the 'Others' Matter, North and South

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An image of Britian and Ireland with photos of the authors

By Mary C. Murphy and Cera Murtagh

One of the enduring consequences of Brexit for the island of Ireland has been to put the question of Irish unity back on the political agenda. That debate is happening against the backdrop of a changing identity landscape across the island. Much has been made of the rise of the so-called ‘middle ground’ in Northern Ireland – of those who don’t identify with traditional ‘unionist’ or ‘nationalist’ labels – and we are told that these ‘others’ will be pivotal to the outcome of any future referendum. But, beyond arithmetic, what does this shift mean at a deeper level for the prospects of Irish unity? Does an identification as ‘others’ find expression in the Republic of Ireland? If so, how might non-traditional and emergent patterns of identity – both North and South – shape the process, outcome and aftermath of a potential border poll?

 

‘The Others’

In Northern Ireland, there has been a marked increase in the number of voters who identify as ‘Neither Nationalist nor Unionist’. The Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) surveys demonstrate that those identifying as ‘neither’ has constituted the largest single group in Northern Ireland since 2006, outstripping those who identify as either Unionist or Nationalist. The Alliance Party, which aligns with neither nationalism nor unionism, once a marginal player, is now the third largest party at Stormont, behind Sinn Féin and the DUP. 

But what does this mean vis-à-vis the Republic of Ireland? There is no such category as ‘others’ in the South. Yet, if we look more closely, striking points of convergence emerge in identity trends North and South, that bear consequences for relations between the two, and for the political future of the whole. 

 

Points of convergence, North and South

For a start, both parts of the island show an increasing detachment from traditional forms of nationalism, and distancing from those political labels.

In the South, nationalism has changed in intensity and form. Since the foundation of the State, we have witnessed a move away from a more hardline nationalism, in society and politics, and towards a tacit acceptance of partition, albeit without diminishing the appeal of a united Ireland. Recent ARINS (Analysing and Researching Ireland North and South) survey data demonstrates that a majority in the south continue to aspire to Irish unity, but levels of support are contingent and conditional on cost and other factors. Over time this more gradualist form of Irish nationalism has taken on a ‘civic’ and banal character that – notwithstanding the recent rise of far-right nationalist movements – reflects a more inclusive, diverse republic.

Beyond national identity, both places have undergone similar social and economic shifts, in line with global trends. Both have experienced secularization since the 1960s and ‘70s, rapidly since the 2000s. Economic trends have followed distinct but similar trajectories over the last thirty years. Migration patterns in both jurisdictions are comparable, with a steep increase in immigration in the 2000s breaking long periods of ethnic and racial homogeneity. Social attitudes have undergone transformation across the island. The rise of social liberalism (reflected in support for marriage equality and abortion) has been a defining force in the politics of the Irish Republic, while a new ‘liberal/conservative’ cleavage has formed in Northern Ireland politics on social issues like LGBTQ+ rights. 

Party politics North and South can appear like parallel universes. Yet even here we observe clear convergences. Parties of the expanding ‘centre-ground’ in Northern Ireland and those of the political mainstream in the Republic strike a surprisingly similar tone when it comes to Ireland’s constitutional future. 

Our analysis of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s handling of the unity question post-Brexit renders distinct echoes of the Alliance Party’s messaging in Northern Ireland. The principle of consent and commitment to the Good Friday Agreement is placed to the fore, and any discussion of the future of the island couched in the language of peace and reconciliation. 

 

Implications for Irish unity? 

So, what does this convergence mean – if anything – for the prospect of Irish unity? While we cannot know the precise impact, it has implications for the process, outcome and aftermath of any change. 

For process, the diversity and fluidity of identity North and South speaks to the need for broader engagement of citizens in a more inclusive debate about Irish unity. Research by colleagues at UCD and the University of Aberdeen demonstrates a strong appetite among voters traditionally less engaged in formal politics – like women, migrants and young people – for engagement in the constitutional debate, and for ‘bread and butter’ issues, like health, housing and childcare, to be placed to the fore in that debate (beyond issues of ‘high politics’ like institutional design and defence). Their research advocates for deliberative fora, like citizens’ assemblies, and a more expansive agenda that encompasses issues of everyday welfare. 

For any future campaign on Irish unity, this fluidity equates to a substantial number of “floating voters” who are ripe to be courted by parties on either side of the debate. 

Survey data clearly demonstrates that voters in the South are currently more focused on policy concerns linked to health, housing, the economy and cost of living than on the question of constitutional change. At minimum, this suggests that in the event of a referendum, a large number of voters will be most swayed by hard-headed material calculations rather than identity appeals. 

This has obvious implications for the messaging and tone party campaigns adopt. It could even exert a moderating effect, as parties like Sinn Féin and the UUP (Ulster Unionist Party) seek to sell their agendas based on socio-economic interests rather than identity per se. Meanwhile, given the large pool of non-aligned voters, ‘civic’ parties in Northern Ireland, like Alliance, stand to play a central role in that debate. 

Without underestimating the potential for polarization and division, these dynamics could create the conditions for a more ‘civic’ debate along the lines of that seen in the lead up to the Scottish Independence referendum in 2014. 

When it comes to the aftermath of constitutional change and the process of constitution-drafting and institution building, this analysis speaks to the critical need to accommodate not just unionism and nationalism, but also the growing number of people who identify with neither tradition. This also has practical implications for the design of government in a united Ireland, for which there are many possible models, as ARINS has explored, including power-sharing between nationalist/unionist or Irish/British blocs along the lines of the current Northern Ireland model. 

There are consequences too for the party system in a future united Ireland, where ‘non-aligned’ voters could make up a majority of voters. The alignment in the discourse of so-called ‘civic’ parties in the North, like Alliance, and mainstream (civic nationalist) parties in the South, like Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, suggests the potential for party alliances and coalitions, or in some cases even mergers (between Fianna Fáil and SDLP, for instance). At the least, it signals more potential for integration between the party systems than has been considered. 

Our analysis identifies distinct but overlapping processes of dealignment from traditional political identities in Ireland North and South. Ironically, amidst the progressive distancing of our societies since the Troubles, more recently we can discern convergence and alignment. 

The rise of so-called ‘others’ and ‘neithers’ in Northern Ireland has resonance in the Republic of Ireland; one that adds complexity, nuance and multiple dimensions to the debate about Ireland’s constitutional future. This bears implications for any future poll on Irish unity, to which policymakers should pay heed.

 

A version of this blog was published online by The Irish Times on 17 March 2026 as part of the Common Ground Voices project. 

Mary C. Murphy is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Irish Institute at Boston College. Cera Murtagh is Associate Professor of Political Science and Irish Studies at Villanova University, Pennsylvania. Their chapter “Civic Politics and Constitutional Change” is published in Political Change Across Britain and Ireland (Edinburgh University Press, 2025).