How state and sub-state nationalists subsume crisis into longstanding territorial conflicts

By Judith Sjistermans, Coree Brown Swan, and Paul Anderson

The cost-of-living crisis hit Europe amid a series of crises—the 2008 financial crisis, 2020 Covid pandemic, and 2021 Russian invasion of Ukraine among them. As illustrated in the data below, the rise in inflation during the cost-of-living crisis was driven by a spike in energy prices resulting from disrupted global supply chains and geopolitical instability.

Meanwhile, territorial conflicts within European states simmered on, including high profile moments like the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, 2017 Catalan independence referendum, and election successes for Flemish nationalists and state nationalists in the UK and Spain in 2023-4. Our research on the relationship between crisis and nationalism finds that during the period of the cost-of-living crisis, both state and sub-state nationalist political parties folded the crisis into longstanding scripts of territorial contestation. 

For state nationalists, the defence of state integrity is underpinned by blaming the cost-of-living crisis on external forces and arguments that the state is the strongest body to defend people from these forces. Crisis is thus global and beyond the control of the state. On the other hand, sub-state nationalists attribute blame for the cost-of-living crisis at least partially to the state, and its dysfunction. The crisis thus becomes further evidence of the state’s failings. That dysfunction is then used to justify claims for further autonomy or independence.

We identify this pattern in three key cases of state and sub-state nationalist contestation: Flanders and Belgium, Catalonia and Spain, and Scotland and the UK. Here, I focus on the first of these. In Flanders, the issue of constitutional change has low salience among voters, even while nationalist parties and their territorial contestation remain constant. These tensions are most visible to outside observers during the country’s long government formation processes, which expose the limits of federal compromise. The cost-of-living crisis provided another arena within which territorial contestation was played out.

Flemish nationalists, represented predominantly by the New Flemish Alliance, argued that the Belgian state hindered the Flemish ability to address the cost-of-living crisis.  In his 2022 budget statement, six months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Flemish Minister-President Jan Jambon said, “Flanders does not have sufficient resources to fully bear the increase in energy bills…I say that honestly, but at the same time it is also frustrating.” This blaming of the state and multi-level structures is then generalized and subsumed into the broader sub-state nationalist script. For example, New Flemish Alliance minister Peter De Roover concluded, “Within Belgium, reform is impossible, and Belgium is a luxury that we can no longer afford.”

State nationalists pointed the finger outward and argued that changes to the structure of the state were impossible in times of crisis. During the 2024 Belgian and Flemish regional elections, state nationalists predominantly argued that constitutional changes would be a distraction from crisis management. As liberal Belgian Prime Minister De Croo said, “Nobody is interested in a  Catalonia moment for Belgium. Nobody is interested in a programme that generates tens of billions in new taxes. Nobody wants to indulge in adventures.” Paul Magnette, leader of the PS, reinforced this claim, saying “[State reform is] not what people expect from us.”

While scholars argue that crisis can engender change or reform, we find that state and sub-state nationalists appear to follow a well-rehearsed script that involves blame-shifting, credit-taking, and subsuming crisis into existing patterns of territorial contestation.

Dr Judith Sijstermans is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen. Her research focuses on sub-state political parties, particularly nationalist and populist parties, with a regional focus on Scotland and Belgium.

Dr Paul Anderson is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Liverpool John Moores University. His research centres on comparative territorial politics, including devolution in the UK, intergovernmental relations, autonomy and secessionist movements, and regional political parties.

Dr Coree Brown Swan is a Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Stirling and Director of the Scottish Political Archive. Her research examines the politics of independence and union, as well as governance in the post-Brexit context.

This blogpost represents the views of the authors, and not necessarily those of Regional and Federal Studies, the Centre on Constitutional Change, or the University of Edinburgh.