Catalonia's DUI

It is time to listen to those proposals for a path forward that lie between independence and the status quo, says Professor Luis Moreno. 
 
The failure of Catalan secessionists to proclaim a declaration of unilateral independence in the Catalan Parliament on October 11 has several readings. It has brought about new uncertainties, but also some momentary public tranquillity coupled with the decision by the Spanish central government not to apply immediately the provisions of the Spanish Constitution (by taking control of Catalonia’s self-rule institutions). This follows the adjournment of the unilateral declaration of independence that Catalonia’s President, Carles Puigdemont, announced seconds after the validation of  the results produced in the unconstitutional referendum held on October 1 (90% of ‘Yes’ votes with a turnout of around 40% of the electoral census). The Spanish acronym used for the Catalan DUI (Declaración Unilateral de Independencia) could be rephrased as ‘delayed unfolding of independence’ (also DUI in English). Several considerations may be taken into account.
 
First, the address by Puigdemont before the Catalan Parliament was questioned by the radical left and anti-EU party CUP (Popular Unity Candidacy), which lends support to the Catalan Government (all pro-independence parties form a legislative majority of 53% of the seats with a popular vote of 48%). It remains to be seen whether the CUP will continue to support Puigdemont and his strategy of eventual dialogue and/or mediation with the Spanish central government.
 
Second, the momentum for separation has suffered a tremendous blow with the decision taking by businesses and corporations to move out from Catalonia. At the time of writing these lines, firms representing some 50% de Catalonia’s GDP have already changed not only their legal headquarters but, more significantly, some of them have filed their fiscal registration in other Spanish locations in order to avoid paying extra taxes to the eventual setting of a possible future Catalan Tax Agency.
 
Third, the EU has repeatedly insisted that Catalonia’s claim for secession is Spain’s ‘internal matter’, and have shown no interest whatsoever in mediating in a highly heated political conflict. Needless to say, this type of mediation would be optimal considering the all-embracing inter pares and supra-national nature of the EU, but it could create at this point in time a dangerous precedent considering the wide variety of pressing ‘internal’ issues occurring in other member states.
 
Fourth, snap parliamentary elections in Catalonia could be a way out of the present deadlock with the fresh renewal of Catalan MPs and the political strengthening --or otherwise-- of the secessionist vote. My colleague Daniel Cetrà rightly points out in a recent post (How will Spain respond to Catalan independence vote?) that pro-independence supporters would inevitably see this option as a step back. This move would most probably create already visible tensions among the plurality of pro-independence parties. But, above all, the electoral outcome would probably result in a penalization to the secessionist bloc after the recent urge of popular mobilization against separation in Catalonia.
 
The effectiveness of the ‘Slovenian option’ adopted by Puigdemont and his nationalist heterogeneous coalition (labelled as‘treason’ by young members of the CUP) remains to be seen in the near future. Let us remembers that the Slovenia Government declared independence on June 25, 1991 only to adjourn simultaneously its legal effects, as has happened now in the case of Catalonia. After the Ten-Day War, a referendum supported by all Slovenian political parties was held on December 26, 1990 (95% of the voters favoured the establishment of independent and sovereign nation).
 
At present it is rather unrealistic to foresee the consequences of the ‘delayed unfolding of the independence’ in Catalonia along the lines of the Slovenian experience. There are no credible grounds even to imagine than an all-party agreement in Catalonia could result in an agreed consultation for independence in the foreseeable future. But a fresh constitutional turn could well take place if the current majority of secessionists MPs were to decide the passing of a motion in Catalonia’s Parliament to change the 1978 Spanish Constitution. This initiative is feasible constitutionally and, although, it would find opposition at the central Parliament, it would provoke a debate all around Spain concerning territorial accommodation, if that is at all possible. Those parties against Catalonia’s independence, but who say there is a need for political compromise in Spain, should expose themselves to the challenge of advancing new proposals.
 

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Luis Moreno's picture
post by Luis Moreno
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)
11th October 2017
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